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1 Executive Summary
A close partnership between people and partially
autonomous machines has enabled decades of
space exploration. But to further expand our
horizons, our systems must become more capa-
ble. Increasing the nature and degree of auton-
omy - allowing our systems to make and act on
their own decisions as directed by mission teams -
enables new science capabilities and enhances sci-
ence return. The 2011 Planetary Science Decadal
Survey (PSDS) and on-going pre-Decadal mis-
sion studies have identified increased autonomy
as a core technology required for future missions.
However, even as scientific discovery has neces-
sitated the development of autonomous systems
and past flight demonstrations have been success-
ful, institutional barriers have limited its matura-
tion and infusion on existing planetary missions.
Consequently, the authors and endorsers of this
paper recommend that new programmatic path-
ways be developed to infuse autonomy, infrastruc-
ture for support autonomous systems be invested
in, new practices be adopted, and the cost-saving
value of autonomy for operations be studied.
2 Motivations
From the beginning of interplanetary exploration,
reliance on on-board decision-making has been
critical for mission success. The use of time-
driven command sequences and critical sequence
retries on the Viking and Mariner 6 & 7 orbiters
resulted in reduced risk and increased the abil-
ity of spacecraft to return science data [1, 2].
Over the following decades, the evolutionary in-
clusion of autonomous functions, primarily in the
domains of spacecraft fault protection, and guid-
ance and control, further reduced mission risk and
increased a spacecraft’s ability to perform and
downlink science measurements. For instance,
the Jovian radiation environment caused multiple
safe mode events during the Galileo mission; but
“smart safing” enabled it to maintain thermally-
safe attitude to protect its instruments despite
immediate loss of operator control. However, the
mission and system complexity needed to answer
new questions in planetary science has outpaced
efforts to mature autonomous capabilities. As de-
tailed in this paper, many of the ambitious mis-
sion concepts described in the Planetary Mission
Concept Studies (PMCS) for the Planetary Sci-
ence and Astrobiology Decadal Survey (PSADS)
and the 2018 Workshop on Autonomy for Future
NASA Science Missions will not be achievable us-
ing the current paradigm of spacecraft control [3,
4].
To answer ever more challenging science ques-
tions, we will need spacecraft that can explore
unknown and dynamic environments with less in-
put from human operators. This will demand an
integrated approach to autonomy, because auton-
omy is a system-level technology that requires
an interdisciplinary approach to technology de-
velopment. The need for a revolutionary ad-
vance in spacecraft autonomy to meet the needs
of NASA’s missions was identified as early as the
1980 Carl Sagan, et al. report to NASA on Ma-
chine Intelligence and Robotics [5]. Yet despite
the need for and past uses of autonomous capa-
bilities, these capabilities are rarely used or even
considered in most planetary missions due to in-
stitutional barriers.
In the Sagan Report, one of the primary barri-
ers to progress in autonomous systems was iden-
tified as culture: “Technology decisions are, to
much too great a degree, dictated by specific mis-
sion goals, powerfully impeding NASA utilization
of modern computer science and technology. Un-
like its pioneering work in other areas of science
and technology, NASA’s use of computer science
and machine intelligence has been conservative
and unimaginative.” Similar cultural issues were
identified at ESA, based on the experience of 2019
OP-SAT mission: “...resistance to experimenta-
tion and innovation, especially when the projected
benefits are not yet flight proven. Time after
time projects settle for reuse rather than inno-
vation.” [6] To wit, the highest level recommen-
dation of this paper is one made by the Sagan
Report: “The advances and developments in ma-
chine intelligence and robotics needed to make fu-
ture space missions economical and feasible will
not happen without a major long-term commit-
ment and centralized, coordinated support.”
3 The Need for Autonomy
The 2015 NASA Technology Roadmap defines au-
tonomy as “the ability of a system to achieve
goals while operating independently of external
control.” [7] External control is exemplified by
the traditional commanding control loop, sum-
marized in Figure 1. Autonomy reduces the char-
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Figure 1: The traditional commanding control loop
has a characteristic timescale that may be greater than
the timescales needed to exercise control. In these
cases, autonomous functions are required.
acteristic control timescale by moving analysis
and planning on board the spacecraft [8]. Mov-
ing functions traditionally performed by mission
teams to on board the spacecraft requires changes
to both flight systems and ground systems.
When the timescale associated with traditional
commanding becomes larger than timescales re-
quired for responding to spacecraft critical events
or interacting in an unpredictable environment,
using a priori planning for control increases mis-
sion risk. Deploying autonomy, in situ percep-
tion, reasoning, and acting under both nominal
and off-nominal situations, mitigates this risk and
allows the spacecraft to make decisions based on
current circumstances.
Commanding timescales are partly driven by
communications for commands and status. For
instance, in the case of planetary rotorcraft like
Ingenuity or Dragonfly, communication is con-
strained by limited data rates (e.g. due to
weak signal), restricted link availability (e.g. a
body’s orbit and day/night cycle), and large
data products required for ground-based plan-
ning (e.g. contextual maps for path planning)
[9]. The timescale of systems responding to
critical events or performing critical operations
is driven by the dynamical nature of system-
environment and system-system interactions and
how predictable and observable these interactions
are. Dynamic rotorcraft mobility in planetary at-
mospheres is incompatible with communication
constraints and has to occur in situ.
It is this relationship between communications-
and dynamical-related timescales that has tra-
ditionally driven requirements for autonomy.
Where the communications timescale exceeds the
dynamical timescale, safe control using strict
Figure 2: Autonomy is necessary when a spacecraft
has to react to changes in the environment or within
itself at a shorter timescale than afforded by communi-
cation constraints. Past missions relied on their abil-
ity to predict but future missions that operate in in-
creasingly unknown environments would fall outside
the controllability threshold.
a priori planning cannot be assured and au-
tonomous functions are required for safe control.
Figure 2 illustrates the control regimes and as-
sociated risks of using a priori planning. It’s
for this reason that autonomous functions were
first used for mission aspects with short dynam-
ical timescales, e.g. guidance, control, and fault
protection [2]. With incremental confidence from
these early missions, more ambitious autonomous
functions were flown to enable more ambitious
science measurements. For example, in 2004
Deep Impact’s Impactor spacecraft required au-
tonomous navigation functions (AutoNav) to in-
tercept Comet Tempel 1 [10]. This was driven by
two primary goals: first, colliding with the comet
using the Impactor spacecraft, and second, ob-
serving the impact on the Flyby vehicle. Because
the exact size, shape, and orbit of the comet could
not be determined in advance from the ground,
closing the navigational loop on-board was nec-
essary to successfully impact the 7 km size comet
at a speed of 10 km/s. The use of AutoNav was
unavoidable to meet the science objective and
AutoNav’s decision-making could be sufficiently
modeled and supervised that it could be trusted.
While using autonomy may be enabling for
some missions, it can enhance mission produc-
tivity and science return for nearly all missions,
increasing a mission’s science-to-dollar ratio. On-
board science data analysis has been used on var-
ious Mars rovers [11, 12] and on Earth Observing-
1 [13] to improve science return and dynamically
target and image novel signatures. For instance,
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Curiosity incorporated Autonomous Exploration
for Gathering Increased Science (AEGIS) to tar-
get the ChemCam laser-induced breakdown spec-
troscopy (LIBS) instrument, targeted preferred
outcrop terrain over 93% of the time as opposed
to blind targeting, which targeted outcrops 24%
of the time [14]. Two additional white papers
submitted to the PSADS, Azari et al and Theil-
ing et al, further describe the advantages of using
science autonomy [15, 16].
However, a lesson learned from Mars rovers,
EO-1, Deep Impact, and Stardust is that flight-
proven and high value-to-risk-ratio autonomous
functions are not regularly used on Flagship or
competed missions. Moreover, these deployments
have not led to the development of system-level
autonomy, which is able to integrate numerous
autonomous and traditional functions. Given
NASA’s track record of developing and de-
ploying autonomous systems and the inter-
action of autonomous functions necessary
for strategic planetary science missions, it
is clear a shift in institutional culture is
necessary.
3.1 Future Planetary Missions and Their
Autonomy Requirements
All of the missions under evaluation by the
PSADS are either enabled by, or would be en-
hanced by, the use of increasingly autonomous
systems. By evaluating aspects of mission ar-
chitecture that constrain communications or are
driven by the dynamics of system-system and
system-environment interactions we can identify
how these missions are enabled and enhanced.
These evaluations are summarized in Table 1, and
additional description for two mission types are
included below.
Landed Missions (landers, hoppers, rovers,
aerial systems) Landed systems are impacted by
similar issues that drive the use of autonomy.
Across these classes of missions, the dynamic as-
pects of operations during entry, descent, and
landing (EDL), roving, flying, and hopping re-
quire situational awareness and in situ reason-
ing and acting. Limited line of sight to Earth
and communication constraints restrict contact
opportunities and data rates. Limited lifetime
and data volume constraints, such as a Europa
or a Venus lander, will need situational aware-
ness, assessment of the interaction with the un-
known surface for sampling, and “smart” target-
ing to increase science return and reduce risk un-
der off-nominal conditions [19]. On-board anal-
ysis of “remote”, low-cost data, like Raman or
LIBS, can significantly reduce risk of performing
high-cost sampling, like drilling [20, 21, 22].
Just as critical to these time-limited missions
is a capability for restorative fault management
that can restore functionality after a safing event,
or take action to avoid the need for a saf-
ing event. As more decision-making capabil-
ity is moved on-board, the scope of autonomous
fault detection, isolation and recovery (FDIR)
functions will increase, relying on on-board re-
planning/scheduling and execution of real-time
contingency actions. This sort of functionality is
broadly applicable to science missions operating
in all contexts but critical to missions with signif-
icant and challenging operations outside available
communication windows. (E.g. Mercury Lander
nighttime operations with six weeks of no ground
contact. Also, Intrepid operations that have to
cover an 1,800 km distance with hundreds of in-
strument placements in four years, where manual
interventions cannot occur more than once every
6–16 km of traverse, or missions seeking to access
extreme surface or subsurface terrains. [23, 24,
25, 26])
Generally, by adopting an approach where
situational awareness (perception, mapping, es-
timation, see [27]), hazard assessment, plan-
ning/execution, payload data analysis, science
planning, and FDIR functions are moved on-
board, landed missions will be more produc-
tive. As an example, results from the Self-Reliant
Rover study, wherein a terrestrial rover was oper-
ated by campaign intent rather sequenced activi-
ties, showed an 80% reduction in sols required to
complete a campaign and 267% increase in loca-
tions surveyed per week [28].
Deep Space Missions Although deep-space pro-
vides a more predictable environment than that
near, on, or into planetary bodies (rendezvous,
proximity operations, surface mobility, below-
surface access), autonomy enables operations
with reduced communication burden and allows
scaling to multi-craft missions for deep-space (or-
biters and flybys). Using autonomous naviga-
tion functions provides tighter turnaround loops
in high dynamic environment situations where
long light-times precludes ground processing to
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Table 1: Summary of how different aspects related to mission architecture can be enabled or enhanced through
the use of integrated autonomous functions.
Aspect of Mission Architecture Drivers
Enabling/Enhancing
Autonomous Functions
Entry, Descent, and Landing, e.g.
- Mercury Lander, Enceladus Orbilander
Surface & Aerial Mobility, e.g.
- Intrepid Rover
- Lunar/Vesta Geochronology Hopper
- Dragonfly, Mars Helicopter
- Short dynamic timescales
- Limited a priori atmosphere/surface
characterization
- One-way light times (OWLTs)
- Terrain-relative navigation (TRN)
and dynamic control
- Hazard assessment and avoidance
- Payload data analysis
- Planning/execution
- Restorative fault management
Short-Lived Landers, e.g.
- Venus Flagship lander
- Europa Lander
- VIPER Rover
- Science competitiveness
- Limited lifetime
- Limited bandwidth and contact opportunity
- Payload data analysis
- Planning/execution
- Restorative fault management
Missions with Opportunistic Science
Potentially all missions, but particularly:
- Fast flyby missions, e.g. [17]
- Monitoring missions, e.g. MOSAIC
- In-situ missions, e.g. Ceres Habitability
- Limited communications and time to
perform critical targeting
- Science competitiveness and impact
- Cost/risk reduction
- Autonomous navigation (enabling
for fast flybys)
- Planning/execution
- Science planning
- Payload data analysis
Interplanetary Cruise, e.g.
- All missions beyond Earth-Moon system
- Missions using electric propulsion, e.g. Persephone
- Mitigating impact of safing on trajectory
(EP missions)
- Cost/risk reduction
- Autonomous navigation
- Planning/execution
- Science planning
- Payload data analysis
Missions with Coordinated Observations, e.g.
- Multi-SC mapping missions, like MOSAIC
- Bistatic radar experiments, e.g. CONCERT
- Planetary defense & impactor/observer missions, e.g.
DART, Small Bodies DRM [18]
- Landed system coordination, e.g. M2020/Mars
Helicopter, lava tube exploration
- Limited time to coordinate with ground-in-
the-loop
- Science competitiveness
- Cost/risk reduction
- Multi-agent coordination
- Planning/execution
- Science planning
- Autonomous navigation
Mapping Missions, e.g.
- Europa Clipper
- MORIE
- Mitigating the impact from anomaly
- Science competitiveness
- Cost/risk reduction
- Planning/execution
- Science planning
Operations in High-Radiation Environments, e.g.
- Europa Clipper
- Io Volatiles Explorer
- Communications delay to restore science
operations may not be acceptable
- Reduce risk/cost
- Restorative fault management
Approach/Rendezvous with Unexplored Bodies, e.g.
- NEO/NEA missions [18]
- Comet Sample Return
- Transneptunian bodies/KBO etc.
- Uncertainty in relative spacecraft/body position
- Unknown irregular body shape and gravity
- Unknown geotechnical properties for landing
- Limited a priori surface characterization
- Autonomous navigation
- Autonomous mapping
- TRN, hazard assessment, landing
- Autonomous surface navigation
- Restorative fault management
achieve required accuracy. Autonomy can en-
able operations in less predictable scenarios, like
atmospheric aerocapture at icy giants, where
turnaround time on ground-based navigation may
induce additional risk, and for planetary constel-
lation where coordinated, multi-spacecraft oper-
ations are required [29, 30].
As the sensitivity of ground-based surveys im-
prove over the next decade, the detection fre-
quency of interstellar visitors, e.g., ‘Oumuamua
and 2I/Borisov, and long-period comets, like
C/2017 K2, is expected to increase [31]. At the
same time, numerous proposals have called for
flybys of distant objects such as Trojans, Jovian
and Saturnian moons, trans-Neptunian objects,
and Kuiper Belt objects. Both sets of missions
face similar challenges: flybys of these bodies in-
volve high relative velocities, limiting the effec-
tiveness of ground-based navigation and science
planning to the point where the mission may not
be feasible. Integrating autonomous navigation,
payload data processing, and planning/execution
functions may be enabling for these missions [17].
In architectures with multiple spacecraft, e.g. a
two spacecraft flyby of a NEO for bistatic radar
investigation, multi-agent coordination, naviga-
tion, and planning/execution can be used to per-
form coordinated measurements to achieve chal-
lenging measurement objectives and maximize
payload utilization based on available resources.
The Mercury, Venus, Ceres, MORIE, MO-
SAIC, and Persephone PMCS reports have base-
lined electric propulsion [24, 32, 33, 34, 35]. Elec-
tric propulsion trajectories are non-Keplerian and
use continuous thrusting to benefit from their
high ISP . However, safe mode events can result
in missed thrust, risking mission success in terms
of schedule and excessive propellant use to cor-
rect trajectory. For Dawn, a four-day period of
missed thrust resulted in a 26-day delay to the
first planned Ceres orbit; a projected seven-day
missed thrust could have resulted in a ∼50-day
delay [36]. Restorative fault management capa-
bility would mitigate the impact of missed thrust.
Missions in the Jovian environment, like Eu-
ropa Clipper, at Mercury, like Mercury Lan-
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der, and missions during solar maxima face in-
creased risk of radiation-induced events that can
induce component resets and induce safe mode
events. Suspending operations as operators in-
tervene may be acceptable during cruise, but dur-
ing critical mission phases like a Europa flyby, it
could cause a mission to fail its mission require-
ments. Restorative fault management could en-
able a spacecraft to recover to an operable state
sufficient to perform critical measurements neces-
sary for meeting mission requirements.
Like EO-1, orbital mapping missions would
benefit from autonomous planning/execution, be-
ing able to opportunistically detect novel signa-
tures, e.g. methane plumes at Mars or volcanic
plumes at Io, and to perform follow-up obser-
vations. Missed coverage imaging, e.g. due to
an anomaly, could also be replanned on board.
Multi-spacecraft monitoring, like MOSAIC or the
NanoSWARM concept, could use multi-agent co-
ordination for event tracking and map complete-
ness [37]. In these cases, autonomy could improve
a mission’s science-to-dollar ratio by increasing
productivity and the value of returned data.
3.2 Institutional Drivers of Autonomy
There are also institutional motivations for us-
ing autonomous functions on-board spacecraft.
A shift in culture that is more accepting of au-
tonomous systems would see its benefits in relax-
ing constraints on deep space communication and
scheduling, mission competitiveness, and achiev-
ing more with the planetary exploration budget.
Deep Space Network & Communications In-
frastructure All missions utilizing the Deep Space
Network (DSN) could be expanded and see im-
provements in science return using adaptive op-
erations. The introduction of deep space Small-
Sat missions is affecting the roadmap for NASA’s
Deep Space Network (DSN) and is leading to
a fundamental change in the way future deep
space missions will interact with ground systems
[38]. With the projected increase in the num-
ber of DSN users, e.g. SmallSats funded through
SIMPLEx, the DSN will need to more efficiently
schedule tracking passes. Increasing the degree of
spacecraft autonomy will allow improvements in
the efficiency of DSN use.
Mission Competitiveness The interrelated fac-
tors of cost, perceived risk, and science return
impact selection of competed missions. Inte-
grating different autonomous functions can afford
PIs more flexibility in meeting science require-
ments, relaxing system requirements on mission
systems, and potentially reducing cost and sci-
ence risk. For instance, using autonomy like au-
tonomous targeting can enable performing novel
and opportunistic measurements, raising a mis-
sion’s threshold science return. Use of auton-
omy like autonomous retry with on-board plan-
ning/execution, can reduce mission risk by allow-
ing a spacecraft to dynamically adopt to on-board
anomalies and reattempt measurements.
A notable example of a mission that could be-
come more competitive should systems autonomy
be used is a New Frontier Venus lander - a con-
cept that has seen multiple failed proposals over
two decades, including the step-two Venus In situ
Composition Investigations (VICI) and the Venus
Surface and Atmosphere Geochemical Explorer
(SAGE) proposals [39, 40]. By integrating the
autonomous functions in Table 1, a Venus lan-
der could more effectively utilize its time before
end-of-mission. Contextual images and remote
Raman/LIBS measurements can direct sampling,
resulting in lower risk on science return. Based on
current development of the NASA ARC Volatiles
Investigation Polar Exploration Rover (VIPER),
this could enable higher performance and better
handling mission-ending faults.
Cost Autonomy could reduce costs to NASA
by moving some of operations team functions on
board. In the last 10 years, SMD has spent
$2.4B FY20 on mission operations [41]. If these
missions had been operated 20% more efficiently,
$480M could have been available to NASA. As
predicted in the 1980 Sagan Report, moving to
“Autonomous Mission Control” by the year 2000
would result in mission operations costs 1% of
those in 1975. While “Autonomous Mission Con-
trol” has yet to be realized, the experience from
past missions and current research supports that
prediction. On EO-1, significant mission time was
saved by having the spacecraft discard imagery
obscured by cloud cover.
4 Why Autonomy Isn’t Standardized
Despite decades of incremental progress in achiev-
ing remarkable successes with the autonomous
functions used on EO-1, different Mars rovers,
and missions like Deep Impact and Stardust, the
broad use of autonomous functions to achieve
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mission objectives is still not standard practice.
While the reasons are interconnected, they can
be generalized as three barriers to infusion.
Barrier 1: Unlike most other NASA
technology investments, autonomy is
system-level technology. Most technologies,
e.g. detectors and propulsion systems, fulfill
specific needs. Their operational conditions
can be readily modeled for laboratory testing
and interfaces and behavior well-defined for
mission development and operations. For these
technologies, the NASA definitions of Technology
Readiness Level (TRL) are a relevant and useful
tool for appraising flight-readiness. Moreover,
incremental investments that raise TRL are ap-
propriate. Autonomy, especially where multiple
functions are integrated, has implications for the
system’s architecture, design, development and
operations processes, and personnel throughout.
It requires coordinated efforts throughout devel-
opment phases and across domains and cannot
be comprehensively adopted through incremental
investments. This means standard paths to
mature technologies do not apply to autonomous
systems. Experience has shown that technology
demonstration missions, like the Remote Agent
Experiment on Deep Space-1, do not transition
to routine science mission use [42].
Barrier 2: Institutional environment lim-
its autonomy to incremental maturation
and thus restricts NASA’s ability to deploy
autonomous systems. Even though autonomy
has the potential to reduce mission risk, using
it is still a perceived risk. NASA has success-
fully executed missions without significant auton-
omy for decades and is capable of developing and
evaluating missions that are enhanced or enabled
by autonomy. As exemplified by AutoNav and
AEGIS and described in the Sagan Report and
ESA OPS-SAT paper, a cultural barrier limits
opportunities to fly enhancing technologies. Risk
aversion results in incremental maturation of spe-
cific autonomous functions, which struggle again
to find their place on science missions despite past
success and potential advantages. Even when
risks are taken on competed missions and they
would stand to benefit in science-to-dollar ratio,
e.g. Dragonfly, opportunistic science is not con-
sidered an intrinsic component of baseline mis-
sions. As also noted in the Sagan Report and still
true today, NASA struggles to pioneer software
advances. The nature of the competitive mission
process drives engineers at NASA and in industry
toward heritage solutions in mission proposals to
avoid perceived risk. Integrated over time, this
steers missions away from innovative advances
that could be enabling for more demanding mis-
sions. There is little interdisciplinary coopera-
tion to offer guidance on performing software- and
autonomy-related trade studies, which could have
significant implications for mission architecture.
This lack of exposure and strained mapping of
TRL to multi-mission autonomous functions fur-
ther reinforces a culture wary of adopting more
advanced autonomy.
Barrier 3: Lack of Inter-Directorate Co-
ordination. The Human Exploration Direc-
torate (HEOMD), the Space Technology Mis-
sion Directorate (STMD), and divisions of Sci-
ence Mission Directorate (SMD) have struggled
to coordinate and lack direct incentive to develop
NASA-wide plans to implement autonomous sys-
tems. This results in fragmented and incremen-
tal progress that will not lead the agency to sus-
tainable advances in multi-mission autonomy. Al-
ternatively, coordinated investments could allow
directorates to leverage developments by others,
promoting agency-wide sharing of standards and
practices, increasing the likelihood autonomous
functions are reflown, and minimizing duplicated
investments. Meanwhile, private industry bene-
fits from investments in autonomy and can push
forward with increasingly autonomous solutions,
e.g. the Falcon fly-back boosters used by SpaceX.
5 Recommendations
Given how autonomy would enable and enhance
strategic missions of interest to the planetary sci-
ence community, we offer the following high-level
recommendations for enabling the routine deploy-
ment, and continued evolution, of autonomy for
future planetary science missions. These high-
level recommendations include several potential
implementations described as examples.
1. Create programmatic pathways that
prepare integrated autonomy systems
for future missions and build institu-
tional trust, e.g.:
• Commit to advancing autonomy by setting
a series of capability deadlines to include
increasing amounts of autonomy on all
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planetary science missions. This would en-
sure that NASA is ready with the needed
processes and capabilities when the time
comes to fly the more ambitious missions
that are enabled by autonomy
• Incentivize adoption of autonomous sys-
tems for PSD Announcements of Opportu-
nity (AOs), e.g. through a cost incentive.
• Coordinate STMD investments with com-
peted missions, e.g. SIMPLEx, so missions
push boundaries of science exploration and
technology demonstration
• Expand programs like the New Frontiers
Homesteader Program and ROSES to in-
clude autonomous functions, system inte-
gration, operator tools, and verification
methods for autonomous systems. (See
Rec #2)
• Instrument AOs for Flagships should offer
an opportunity for collaborative propos-
als with complementary instruments using
autonomy for payload data processing and
science planning
• Use all extended missions for demonstrat-
ing autonomous functions
2. Invest in infrastructure for developing
and supporting autonomous systems in
space, e.g.:
• With inter-directorate coordination, invest
in an in-space autonomy testbed, poten-
tially utilizing SmallSats, so NASA cen-
ters and industry can test and flight vali-
date flight and ground software and train
on new processes (See Rec #3)
• Make DSN and Advanced Multi-Mission
Operations System (AMMOS) invest-
ments that support the anticipated growth
of customer missions and use of au-
tonomous systems
• Expand Homesteader and ROSES op-
portunities to cover interdisciplinary au-
tonomous research and development (See
Rec #1)
• Set specific objectives and a time frame for
transitioning AMMOS away from a priori
planning (e.g., change from time-based se-
quencing to goal-based commanding). Set
a date where all new missions would be
expected to use this new paradigm.
3. Invest in practices that promote the
multi-mission use of autonomous sys-
tems. Practices includes design, devel-
opment, test, verification, and opera-
tions processes and standards, e.g.:
• Develop common architectural patterns,
principles and standards to enable con-
fident integration of autonomy technolo-
gies; invest in updates to development and
operations processes to enable the trust-
worthy deployment of increasingly au-
tonomous missions
• Update mission selection and review pro-
cesses to consider assessment of agency
risk posture, e.g., the risk of not includ-
ing new technology or methods in NASA
planetary science missions.
• With inter-directorate coordination, in-
vest in laboratory and virtual autonomy
testbeds so NASA centers and industry
can test and validate autonomy software
and train on new processes. (See Rec #2)
• Spur the adoption of integrated au-
tonomous functions in industry to support
NASA’s competed missions. (See Rec #1)
• Adopt new maturity evaluations for soft-
ware and model trust to augment TRL in
assessing autonomous functions, their in-
tegration, and applications.
4. Set goals to reduce operations costs
and determine the degree of au-
tonomous operations required to
achieve these goals. NASA should
commission an independent study, poten-
tially performed by the National Academy
of Sciences, assessing existing operations
to evaluate how operations costs can be
reduced by adopting autonomy and what
funding and savings profiles would result.
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